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Alesina  explains  how recent developments  in  If political  and economic  resources  are
political  economics  improve  our understanding  unequally  distributed,  and it is obvious  which
of macroeconomic  policy  - especiaUy  the  group is stronger  and has resources  to wait
timing,  design, and likelihood  of stabilization's  longer,  a "war of attrition"  ends immediately,  as
success  through  monetary  and fiscal refonn.  there is no uncertainty  about  who will win it.
Delay  is more  likely when information  about
Alesina  reviews the literature  on political  who will bear  the cost of delays  is uncertain  or
business  cycles and emphasizes  several  issues  unevenly  distributed.
involving  the relationship  between  the timing of
elections  and the timing of macroeconomic  Delay  is also more  likely when  there is
policies and outcomes.  agreement  about  the need for fiscal  change but a
political  st dlemate  about distribution  - about
He also addresses  how models  can be useful  how  the burden  of higher taxes  or spending  cuts
in studying  nondemocratic  systems.  Two forces  should  be allocated.
are crucial factors  in both democratic  and
dictatorial  systems,  although  they may manifest  Stabilization  usually  occurs when  there is
themselves  differently:  (1) the policymakers'  political consolidation.  The burden  of stabiliza-
incentive  to retain  power and (2) society's  tion is sometimes  unequal,  with the politically
polarization  and the degree  of social  conflict.  weaker  group  (often  the lower classes)  bearing a
larger burden  (often  regressive  measures).
Alesina  then analyzes  why economic  stabili-
zation is delayed,  even  when it is obvious  that  If it is in the interest  of the current  govem-
sooner or later a stabilization  program  wil have  ment to do nothing  for fear of failure  because of
to be adopted.  Some points made in the paper  government  incompetence,  the  public may have
follow:  no incentive  to vote for the opposition  because
the opposition  may also do nothing,  the crucial
Certain institutional  characteristics  make  factor  here is how aware  the government  is of its
quick  and successful  stabilization  more  or less  own  incompetence  and thus its reasons  for not
likely. The more  unequal  the distribution  of  attempting  reform.
stabilization's  costs, the more likely  that stabili-
zation will be delayed.  An increase  in the cost of  Successful  stabilization  usually  comes after
postponing  stabilization  reduces  the delay.  several  failed attempts,  and the successful
Political  institutions  that make it easier  for small  program  is often  very much like one that failed.
interest groups  to "veto" legislation  make  delay
more  likely.
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Economists  typically study policymaling in models where a "benevolent social planner"
optimally chooses economic policy  instruments in  order  to  maximize the  welfare  of  a
represntative individual, given certain resource constraints.
From a nonmative  point of view these models  are an extremely  important tool of analysis.
From a positive  point of  view they cannot explain the  occurrence of  frequent and large
deparures from 'first best" policies. In addition, models  with a "social  planner" cannot explain
why different countries  at  different points  in  time  exhibit  extremely different  economic
performances  even though they face similar  economic  problems, and have comparable  resources.
A politico-economic  approach  takes into account the institutional  constraints and rigidities
in which policymaldng  occurs, by emphasizing  the role of distributive  conflicts, ideological  and
oppormtunistic  incentives of the politicians, etc.  Once these political  variables are appropriately
brought into the  analysis,  economic policy decisions which  "prima facie"  appear wildly
incoherent and sub-optimal, can be interpreted as the rational outcome of a politico-economic
equilibrium. Such an approach not only is valuable from a positive perspective, but also is rich
of normative implications.  In fact, it provides insights on how to design institutions which
facilitate the  achievement of  efficient economic outcomes.  Given the  current process of
transition  to democracy of Eastern European countries, such problems  of institutional  design are
truly at the heart of the current policy debate.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight  how recent developments  in political economics,
help understanding macroeconomic policy,, and  more specifically, the  timing, design  and
likelihood  of success of stabilizations  through monetary and fiscal reforms.2
In addressing these important issues, two basic, and very general forces will always
appear as  crucial  factors:  1) the  policymakers' incentive to  retain  power;  2)  society's
polarization and degree of social conflict. These two elements of the analysis play a crucial role
in both democratic and dictatorial systems, although  they may manifest themselves differently
in different institutional contexts.'
The paper  is  organized as  follows.  Section 2 discusses the role of  "mo,Ly  m
politico-economic  models and other related methodological  issues. Section 3 addresses tne
of the timing of macroeconomic policy in general, and fiscal reforms in particular in relation to
the timing of  "elections".  The  focus of  this section is how ideological and opportunistic
considerations  influence the choice of when to implement  certain  policies.  This section  reviews
the literature on "opportunistic" and "partisan" political cycles and emphasizes what one can
learn from this literature  which is relevant for countries simultaneously engaging in policy
reforms and democratization.  Section 4 analyzes the related issue of why stabilizations  are
delaved. The emphasis here is on why sub-optimal  economic  outcomes such as hyperinflations
and 'out of control" budget deficits are not corrected for extended  periods of time, even when
it is totally obvious that something will have to be done about these problems sooner or later.
This section will also emphasize which politico-institutional  features are more likely to lead to
the timely adoption of successful stabilization  programs.  The last section briefly concludes.
2.  Why "Rational" Models?
Politico-economic models are  often invoked to  explain observations which seem in
conflict with  standard economic rationality.  Thus, one is immediately tempted to abandon3
altogether the notion of 'rational behavior",  defined as the maximization  of individual utility
under constraints,  which  also implies the efficient use of all the available information in forming
expectations. Much too often, politico-economic  models hold the view that societies can be
charactrized  by a bunch of crooks (the politicians) who manipulate a bunch of idiots (the
citizens). It is often too easy to explain apparent depamt  from efficient collective behavior
with  'stupidity", lack of understanding of  basic economic relationships, short-sightedness,
forgetfulness,  incoherence,  etc. Interpretive  schemes and models in which non-rational  behavior
and non-rational  expectations  play a crucial role should be used only as a  "last resort", after
having considered  other explanations.
Two compelling  arguments  justify this view.  The first is that economic rationality  (i.e.,
maximization  of individual  utility under constraints)  underlies our basic economic models. Why
should we be ready to assume that our economically rational investors, consumers, workers
become suddenly  dumb voters and naive citizens?
The second argument is that one of the most important contribution that the political-
economic  approach  has to offer is to provide explanations  for the observed large differences  in
economic performance of countries with similar economic problems, resources and level of
development. If the basic explanation  for the observed outcomes is "lack of rationality", than
one has to believe that, what differentiates various countries in the  world is  the degree of
rationality  of their citizens, consumers, voters and leaders.  This view is rather unappealing.
The most common  objections  to the assumption  of rationality  in politico-economic  models
can be summarized  as follows:4
1) Voters have no incentive  to gather information, and empirical evidence show that they
know very little about politics.
First of all, "rationality" simply requires that an agent uses efficiently  all the information
which  he has; "rationality" has nothing to do with the amount of 2vailable  information. The -ast
literature on decision theory under uncertainty and game theory with imperfect information,
show how the behavior of a poorly informed "rational" agents, can be ver" Aifferent  from that
of naive agents, (see Tirole (1989)). Second, in many political models very little is required to
the voteb,  .eor instance in several spatial models of elections, all that is required is that the
voters know which party is on the left of the other.
2) Even economists  are studying models with "limited or near rationality".
In  fact,  several  economists 2 have  studied  models which  emphasize  how  "small"
departr  from rational behavior can lead to significant economic effects.  This idea is quite
interesting.  However, the kind of irrationality often invoked in politico-economic  model is not
Wsmall";  on the contrary, it is very "large" and of a completely  different order of magnitude  than
that of "near rational" models in economics.  For example, in traditional models of  "fiscal
illus'--  (for instance Brennan and Buchanan (1980))  voters are not supposed to understand  that
more public goods imply higher taxes sooner or later.  In the traditional  political business cycle
models pioneered by Nordhaus (1975),  voters are not supposed to  learn from the past that
incumbents  manipulate the economy before each election. These are definitively not examples
of "near rationality".
3) Indi1-viduls are  not only  self-motIvated,  they have  "ideologies"  and  may care about
their fellow citizens, or at least some of them.5
This is not inconsistent with rationality.  In fact, Section 2 discusses models in which
'partisan'  politicians act as if they followed an ideology, in addition to being self-interested.
All that is required by a  "rational approach'  is that political and economic behavior is not
inconsistent with given preferences, constraints and information.  Furthermore, an "ideology"
can be interpreted as a systematic statement  of preferences  concerning  political outcomes which
are related to the resources and constraints  of different actors.
4) You cannot expect individuals  to make all the necessary and complicated calculations
needed to act "rationality".
We do  not require that consumers can take partial derivatives in  order to compute
marginal rates of substitutions when they shop in supermarkets.  Nevertheless, we believe in
basic coastmer theory, and in the idea that demand curves are downward sloping.  The same
arguments apply to politics.
5) Leaders are not capable of acting rationally, because they and their advisoa  do not
have enough technical preparation to adopt the correct policy decisions.
In  most cases the crucial ingredients of policy reforms are  very simple.  The real
difficulties are political; for instance, how to  share the burden of  the adjustment, how to
implement  the progam  without  creating  social unrest, and so on. Political issues are much more
difficult than technical issues of how to design the "perfect" program, from the point of view
of economic theory.  This is not meant to deny that good "technical" advice to leaders is not
important; nevertheless, political conflicts and constrints  are often much more difficult to
overcome than technical difficulties.  Otherwise, one would be led to the conclusion that, for
instance, the much below average economic  performance of Latin America is due to a below6
average  competence  of the economic advisors  of Latin America, a rather unappealing  hypothesis.
This does not mean, however, that government "competence" is relevant.  More competent
governments are  more likely to minimize the costs of adjustments.  (See Section 4 for more
discussion of this point.)
3.  Political Cycles and Economic Cycles 3
This section reviews the theory and the empirical evidence of political  cycles m ecoromic
policy making.  Most  of  this  literature has  been developed with  reference to  advanced
democracies, but subsection 3.6 discusses  how this line of work provides insights for analyzing
non-democratic systems and systems in transition to democracy.
Different models  of politcal cycles  emphasize  either the "opportunistic' or the "partisan"
incentives of policymakers.  In "opportunistic" models, the policymakers maximize only their
probability of  reelection, or,  more generally, their probability of  "survival" in office.  In
'partisan"  models, different political parties represent the interests of different constituencies
and,  when  in  office,  follow  policies  which  are  favorable  to  their  supporting groups.
Traditionally, left wing parties have been more concerned with the problems  of unemployment,
while the right wing parties are relatively more willing to bear the costs of unemployment  to
reauce infraton.
This literature has developed in two clearly distinct phases.  The first one, in the mid-
seventies, is due to the work by Nordhaus  ('9.75) and Lindbeck (1976)  on "opportunistic"  cycles
and by Hibbs (1977) on "partisan" cycles.. These papers share a "pre-rational expectations"7
model of the economy and are based upon the existence of an exploitable "Phillips curve",
relating inflation and unemployment.
The second phase took off it  the mid-eighties  as a branch of tta  game-theoretic  approach
to the positive theory of macroeconomic  policy pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1977)  and
Barro and Gordon (1983).  Culderman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff
(1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990) develop rational  "opportunistic" models; Alesina
(1987) develops a rational partisan model. These models depart from their predecessors  in two
important dimensions.  First,  the  assumption of  economic agents'  rationality makes real
economic activity less directly and predictably  influenced by economic policy in general, and
monetary policy  in  particular.  Second, voters'  rationality  implies  that  they  cannot be
systematically  wfooled' in equilibrium. That is, a repeated, openly opportunistic  behavior  would
be "punished" by the voters.
3.1  The "Political  Business Cycle"
The assumptions underlying Nordhaus' apolitical  business cycle'  (henceforth  PBC) can
characterized as follows:
A.1)  The economy is described by  a stable Phillips curve,  in  which growth (and
unemployment)  depend upon unexpected  inflation.
A.2) Inflation expectations  are adaptive; that is, current expected inflation depends  only
upon past inflation.8
Combining  A.  1) and A.2) leads to the result  that an increase  in inflation  always  leads  to
a reduction  of unemployment  (and an increase  in growth);  this  is because,  since  expectations  are
adaptive,  they catch up with  a lag to actual  inflation.
Ao3) The policymaker  controls  the level  of aggregate  demand  by means  of monetary  and
fiscal  instruments.
A.4) Politicians  are "opportunistic": they only care about  holding  office, and the'. do
not have "partisan"  objectives.
A.5) Voters  ame  mainly  "retrospective".  They  judge the incumbent's  perfonnance  based
upon  economic  performance  during the incumbents'  term  of office,  and heavily  discount  past
observations.  Also the voters cannot  distinguish  between  good economic  conditions  caused  by
'luck' or by skillful  policies.
Under  these  assumptions,  Nordhaus  derives  the following  testable  implications:  (i)  every
government  follows the same policy; (ii) towards  the end of his term  of office, the incumbent
stimulates  the economy,  to take  advantage  of the "short  run" more  favorable  Phillips  curve;  (iii)
tle  -te of inflation  increases  around the election  time as a result of the pre-electora:  economic
expansion;  after the election,  inflation  is reduced  with  contractionary  policies. 4 Thus  one  should
observe  high growth and low unemployment  before each election  and a recession  after each
election.9
3.2  "Rational"  Political  Business  Cycle  Models
Work by Culderman  and Meltzer (197),  Rogoff  and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990),
Persson  and Tabellini  (1990)  has developed  the "political  business  cycle" model  in a rational
direction.
In a nutshell,  this line of work  removes  assumption  A.2 and substitutes  it with;
A.2') Economic  agents  have  rational  expectations  conceming  all the relevant  economic
variables.
A.2X)  Voters  cannot  perfectly  asses  the level  of "competence"  of the incumbent;  that is,
they can only imperfectly  distinguish  between  the effects  of "unlucky  shocks"  to the economy
from the effect  of the government's  lack  of competence  in handling  the economy.
Assumption  A.5), which  implies  naive  retrospective  voting  behavior,  is substituted  by:
A.5') Each voter chooses  the candidate  which  is expected  to deliver  the highest  utility
for himself,  given  his rational  expectations  of post-electoral  economic  outcomes. In particular,
the voters, try, as best as they can, given their information,  to disentangle  the effects  on the
economy  of exogenous  shocks  from the effects  of economic  policy.
Policymakers'  "competence'  is defined  as their  ability  in reducing  'waste" in the budget
process,  in promoting  growth  without  inflation  or in their  ability  to quickly  react to unexpected
shocks.  Also, an important component  of  "competence"  is the degree of corruption  of
government  officials.
The basic assumption  of this model is that policymakers  are more informed  than the
citizens  about their "compettzx".  By taking  advantage  of this informational  asymmetry,  and
by trying  to appear  as competent  as possible,  politicians  behave  in a way  leading  to a Nordhaus10
type  PBC. However,  given  voters' rationality  and awareness  of politicians'  incentives,  the latter
are limited  in their  'opportunistic"  behavior. If politicians  appear  too openly  as "opportunistic",
they might  in fact b:e  punished  by the voters.  Thus, the electoral  cycles in these "rational"
models,  are more  short lived, smaller  in magnitude  and less regular  than  in Nordhaus'  model.
For example,  Rogoff  and Sibert  (1988)  and Rogoff (1990),  consider  a budget  problem,
and have  empirical  implications  on opportunistic  cycles  on monetary  and fiscal  variables.  ;-ther
than on unemployment  and output.  Specifically  these papers suggest that before elections
monetary  and fiscal  policies  should  be relatively  loose. Fiscal  stabilizations  with tax increases
would  tend to be postponed  to after  the election,  while spending  program  and transfer  payments
would  be anticipated  before  the election. However,  these short  run budget  manipulations  may
not have  any effects  on GNP  growth  or unemployment.
3.3  The  "Partisa  Theory"
A strong  version of the "partisan  theory"  Hibbs ((1977),  (1987)),  based unon a non-
rational  expectation  mechanism,  adopts  assumpdons  A. 1, A.2, and A.3. Assumptions  A.4 and
A.5 are substituted  by:
A.4') Politicians  are "pardsan",  in the sense that different  parties  maximize  different
objective  functions.  Left wing parties attribute  a higher cost to unemployrr-st  relative to
inflation  than right wing parties.
A.5"')  Each voter is aware of the partisan  differences  and votes for the party which
offers  the policy  closer to her most  preferred  outcome.11
The  assumption of  partisanship is  justified by  the  distributional consequences of
unemployment. Hibbs shows that, in the U.S.; in periods of high unemployment, low growth
and low inflation  the relative share of income of the upper middle  class increases and vice versa.
Obviously,  since  both inflation  and unemployment  are "bads", both political  parties will proclaim
that if elected, they will fight both of them.  The "pardsan" model doe. not require ta,  say,
he right party actually  prefers high unemployment  to Iow unemployment. It simply requires
that the right is willing to bear more costs in terms of unemployment  to achieve a reduction of
inflation.  Hibbs (1987) discusses  at length, how, in the US, the official electoral platforms of
the two major parties reveal differences  of emphasis  on the costs of unemployment  and inflation.
Thus, this model implies that different parties choose different points on the Phillips
curve:  output growth  and  inflation should  be  permanently higher  and  unemployment
permanently lower  when the left is in office than with right wing govemments. More generally,
fiscal policy will have a  'partisan  bias";  for instance capital taxation will be used more
extensively by the left, etc.
3.4  'Rational Partisan Theory'
Alesina (1987)  and (1988)  develops  a "rational  partisan theory", by adopting  assumptions
A.1, A.2',  A.3, A.4' dnd A.5"'.
This model  generates a political cycle if nominal wage contracts are signed at discrete
intevals  (which do not coincide with the political  terms of office) and that electoral outcomes
are cc ante uncertain.  The basic idea of the model is that, given the sluggishness in  wage12
adjustments, changes in  the  inflation rate  associated  with  changes in  government create
temporary deviations  of real economic activity'from its natural level.
More specifically, the following testable implications can be derived from the model:
(i) at the beginning of a right wing (left wing) govemment output growth is below (above) its
natural level and unemployment is above (below);  (ii) after  exr .- ations, pri;s  Z-d wages
adjust, output  and unemployment  return to their natural level; after this adjustment period, which
should last for no more  than a  couple of years,  the level of economic activity should be
independent  of the party in office; (iii) the rate of inflation should remain higher  -oughout the
term of a left wing government.  That is,  the time consistent (but sub-optimn  inflation rate
remains higher for left wing parties even after the level of economic  activity returns to its natural
level beca ise of a "credibility' problem.  The public knows that the left has a strong incentive
to follow expansionary  policies to reduce unemployment. Thus expected inflation is high when
the left is in office.  In particular, because of rtional  expectations, after the inidal adjustment
to the new regime expected inflation is high enough so that the government does not have an
incentive  to inflate more.  Thus, actual inflation is equal to expected  inflation and unemployment
is at its natural level.  See Persson and Tabellini (1990) for a recent survey of these 'credibility"
models.
In summary, this "rational" model differs from the tradLi nal "partisan" one because it
emphaes  how differences in growth and unemployment associated  to changes of government
are only temporary.  For example, a left wing or a "populist" government, strongly committed
to reducing unemployment by means of expansionary aggregate demand policies is bound to
"succeed"  only in the short run.  After a brief period in which unemployment  may actually fall,13
such a government will find itself "trapped" in a high inflation equilibrium with no benefit on
the unemployment  side.  According to Hibbs' ntodel  a left wing government could permanently
lower the rate of unemployment  by permanently increasing  the rate of inflation.
3.5  Empirical Evidence for OECD Democracies
Three recent papers by Alesina (1989), Alesina  and Roubini (1990) and Alesina, Cohen
and Roubini (1991) have provided several tests of political  cycle models on a sample of all the
OECD democracies for the period 1960-1987. Their conclusions  can be summarized  in two
general points:  (1) the new "rational" approaches  to modelling  opportunistic  and pardsan cycles
are much more successful empirically than their predecessors; (2) partisan effects are rather
strong on economic outcomes, such as growth, unemployment  and inflation; 5 "opportunistic"
effects are  small in  magnitude and appears only on policy instruments, particularly budget
deficits. 6
The  traditional iBC  model by  Nordhaus is  generally rejected  quite  strongly and
unambiguously  on growth and unemployment. On the contrary, same evidence of opportunistic
budget and monetary electoral cycles is found.  These findings  are consistent with the "rational
view", which emphasizes the limit in the latitude available to policymakers in systematically
fooling the voters by appropriately timing recessions  and expansions.
The data also seem to be better explined  by a "rational" version of the parsn  theory
rather than the traditional  Hibbs' specification  of this theory. In fact, difference  in growth rates
and unemployment have a "partisan" connotation,  but are observable only in the short run, for
about 18 to 24 months after a change of govemment. In this period the difference in growth and14
unemployment  between left wing and right wing governments  are quite substantial.  However,
these  differences  completely  disappear  about  two  years  after  the  government  change.
Furthermore, Alesina and Roubini (1990) find that the  "partisan theory" of  macroeconomic
policy fits better and is more appropriate for countries  which either have a two-party system or,
at least, have two clearly identifiable "right" and 'left'  coalitions. .vith clearly marked shifts
from one to the other.  For instance, the countries which provide a better fit for the theory
include the U.S., the U.K.,  Germany, France, Australia and New Zealand.  On the contrary,
this approach is not very  successful in describing countries witn large  "middle of the road"
coalition governments, such as Italy or Belgium.
3.6  Politcal  Cycles in Non-Democracies  and the Problem .of Transition to Democracy
Empirical research on political cycles in non-OECD democracies is much more limited
and, therefore, any new results in this area would  be very valuable. It is important to emphasize
a distinction between dictatorships and periods of transition to democracy:  I shall begin with
dictatorships.
DI;._  ship~'  _ a very  heterogeneous group.  First of  all, one  should distinguish
between *strong" and  "weak" dictators.  Strong dictators are  those whose survival is  not
seriously threatened, given a certain domestic and international  political and military balance.
Strong dictators are themselves heterogenous. Some of them have promoted economic growth
and macroeconomic  stability in their countries.  Others have wrecked their economies.  Given
such heterogeneity, any attempt to show that dictatorships  as a group exhibit a superior (or
inferior) economic performance  relative to  democracies as  a  group  usually ends up  with15
inconclusive  results.  More generally, that vast literature on democracy and growth has not
reached  conclusive evidence regarding their relationship. 7
"Weak" dictators are those in danger of being overthrown:  In fact, if social discontent
increases, the dictator's "probability  of survival' decreases." When a dictator is in such  danger,
his incentives may not differ too much from those of an incumbent president or prime minister
in a democracy, before an uncertain election.  Thus, one may look for 'opportunistic' policies
and loose  fiscal policies  when "weak" dictators are in danger of being overthrown. Ames (1986)
studies opportunistic behavior of Latin American rulers, with particular reference to "budget
cycles' and the opportunistic use of fiscal and military policies.  llis  author shows that Latin
American dictators have followed fiscal policies which, in  some respects, are a magnified
example of the Idnd of opportunistic  policies described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above.  Ames
documents  how public expenditure was used to please key constituencies  and, in particular, the
military sector, when a ruler felt in danger of begin overthrown.
In fact, immediately  before dictators are overthrown, the "worst'  ppornistic  and self-
interested  policies may be observed, for two reasons.  First, collapsing  dictators are struggling
for survival, and are willing to do "anything", since they feel that they have no future.  Any
consideration  of 'good" economic  management  is secondary  to the goal of remaining  politically
(and physically!)  alive.  Second, 4f  a dictator becomes  convinced  that his time horiz  in office
is very short, he may simply decide to steal from the country's wealth  for his own personal  gain
and for his close supporters.
As a result, collapsing dictators  are likely to bequeath  to their successors  economies  with
serious macroeconomic imbalances; thus,  new  democracies inherit very difficult economic16
problems.  In  addition,  new democratic govemments may  feel  particularly  strongly the
partisan" pressures for "doing something" for the social groups who have recently obtained a
voice in the political arena.  Furthermore, new democracies are particularly subject to the risk
of being overthrown, more so when the groups and constituencies suppor:nrr -e  old reeime
have a voice and political or military influence.  As a result, new democracies face a difficult
problem  tf survival and may find it particularly difficult to follow "though" policies implying
short run economic costs: c.c.n new democrac-  may have to be opportunistic to "survive".
Unfortunately, as argued above, new democracies may come to office exactly at the time when
"though" policies  are called for and cannot be postponed.
Haggard, Kaufman, Sheriff and Webb (1990) analyze both opportunistic and partisan
cycles in a sample of middle  income countries with particular emphasis on periods of transition
to democracy.  Haggard and Kaufman (1989) convincingly argue that transitional democracies
face the  most difficult pressures and  show the worst economic outcomes, reladve to  both
estab! ehed democracies  and dictatorships. Some  recent results on economic growth is consistent
with this observation.  Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1991) show that, on average, the
growth performance  of dictatorships  and democracies  is indistinguishable. Also, they find that
a high probability of a government  collapse reduces growth.  These observations are consistent
with the view that highly unstable "tWansitional"  periods are worse for the economy  than periods
of stability.
Finally,  it  is  important to  highlight that  the  "partisan"  theory  implies a  positive
relationship between the degree of  political and  social polarization and  the  variability of
macroeconomic  policies which in turn affects the variability and level of economic  outcomes.17
In fact, as emphasized  above, the 'partisan" theory is based upon the view that because
of  different  distributional  preferences,  different  parties  have  different  preferences  of
macroeconomic  policies (Hibbs 1987). The more different are these distributional  preferences,
the more volatile is macroeconomic  policy.  From this perspective, "populist"  cycles in Latin
America can be viewed as a magnification  of 'pardsan"  cycles in OECD democracies. Populist
policies are in fact defined as the use of aggregate policies (monetary and fiscal) in order to
achieve substantial redistribution of  income and  wealth (Dombusch and Edwards (1992)).
Populist govemments are often followed by right wing regimes which attempt to reverse the
populists' redistributions.
These  macroeconomic policy  cycles  often  introduce  a  very  large  variance  and
uredic;tability  in expectations of future policies.  Such uncertainty is likely to be associated
with poor economic performance by making long run planning more difficult.  Recent results
by 6zler  and Rodrik  (1991) and Alesina, Ozler,  Roubini and Swagel (1991) suggest links
between the degree of political uncertainty and instability and the level of investments and
growth in large samples of countries which include Latin America.
4.  Delays in Policy Reforms
One of the most puzzling observations in political economics is  hat several countries
follow policies for extended periods of time which are recognized as being infeasible  in the long
run.  In particular, rapidly accumulaing public debts with skyrocketing  debt to GNP ratios and
hyperinflations.  These observations are particularly puzzling for those cases, which are quite
common, in which the more a country waits the more costly will be the stabilization  programe
18
when finally adopted.  Similar arguments apply to the apparently inexplicable delays in trade
reforms to eliminate socially  inefficient  forms ofprotection.  In its most general terms the puzzle
is the following:  why certain reforms which are "efficient" in the sense that they increase
aggregate welfare are delayed?
Clearly, no single model can explain every case of deLay  in policy reforms.  Dift..ernL
explanations may play a role in different cases, although  certain arguments appear, in general,
more convincing than others.  I shall begin by reviewing some of what I consider the least
compelling explanations.
The first one is that countries which delay reforms do not understand that such reforms
are unavoidable.  This is unconvincing  since in most cases the macroeconomic  imbalances  are
so macroscopic that no one in his right mind could deny the need for a monetary and fiscal
stabilization.  'Reasonable persons'  can, in some cases, disagree about the speed, urgency  and
design  of  a  stabilization progm  for  "technical'  reasons.  Most  often,  however,  these
'technical'  discussions are, in reality, the reflection of underlying distributional conflicts. (See
below.)
A second explanation is that governments  wait to stabilize untl  some exogenous  shocks
make the stabiliztion  program less costly.  Thus, there is an  'option value" in waiting as
suggested by Orphanides (1990).  Such an approach leaves unexplained why, as is often the
case,  countries do  not  stabilize as  soon as  favorable shocks occur and  why  many actual
stabilizions  take place without  any prior realization  of pardtcularly  favorable economic  shocks.
A third argument is that since stabilizations  are costly in the short run, they are postponed
until "things get really bad".  This is irrational, since the more a country waits the more costly19
is the stabilization. According  to this model, different  countries' experiences  would  be explained
by different degrees of rationality, an argument which is hardly convincing.
Explanations which are not based upon collective irrationality or lack of understanding
of basic economic relationships are more sound.  In  the remainder of  this section, I  shall
highlight a few, organized in four different types of models:
1) "war of attrition" models based upon an uncertain  distribution of the costs of delaying
the stabilizations;
2) models which focus upon the conflicts of interests of specific social groups, such as
labor and capital;
3) models which emphasize  the uncertainty  about the outcome of the stabilization;
4) models which emphasize the role of certain institutional arrangements, such as the
degree of independence of the Central Bank.
4.1  Stabilizations  as "wars of attrition'
Alesina  and Drazen (1991)  argue that, often, the process leading to a monetary and fiscal
stabiliion  can  be described as  a  "war of  attrition" between socio-economic groups with
conflicting distributional interests.
The basic idea is the following.  Consider an economy, where, for whatever reason, a
budget deficit appears.  A stabilization  is defined as an increase in "regular" income taxes which
diminate the deficit.  For simplicity and without loss of generality, government spending is
assumed to be constant.20
Before  a stabilization occurs, gove.mment  spending and the interests on the external debt
are paid for by the govemment in part by borrowing abroad, and in part by means of a highly
distortionary tax.  For concreteness, the pre-stabilization  tax is thought of as an inflation tax,
and it is assumed to be more distortionary  than regular income taxes.  In such a situation, a
'social planner'  managing an economy populated  by identical individuais woiud not delay the
stabilization program.  In  fact, delays are  socially costly for two reasons:  first,  until the
stabilization  occurs, distortionary means of taxation are used; second, the longer one waits, the
more the debt accumulates, the higher is the interest bill for the government.
Even though a "social  planner" would  stabilize  immediately,  the political conflict t-  t-veen
heterogenous groups over the allocation of the burden of the stabilization leads to "rational"
delays.  Suppose that the burden of the stabilization  is not divided equally between groups.  In
particular, assune that there are two competing  groups, and the "loser" will pay a share of the
stabilization  costs (i.e., a share of income taxes) higher than 1/2.  Suppose, further, that the two
groups are not identical: in particular, they differ in the utility loss which they suffer in the pre-
stabilization  period.  For instance, the 'high cost" group is the one for which the costs of living
in an "unstable" economy are particularly high.  An important element necessary to  obtain
delayed stabilizations is  that each  group's  costs of  delaying the  stabilization are  private
information.  Each group only knows its own cost, and has a probability distribution over the
opponent's costs.
The stablization occurs when one of the two groups "concedes", that is, it accepts being
the "loser" and paying a high fraction  of the taxes needed to eliminate the deficit.  Stabilizadons
do not occur immediately because each group has a "rational" incentive to wait, hoping that the21
opponent  wilU  concede first.  In equilibrium, the group with the highest costs of waiting will
concede, but it is the passage of time which w'ill reveal which is the high cost group.  The
concession  tine is determined  by the condition that the marginal cost of not conceding, i.e., the
cost of remaining in the unstable economy for another "instant" is equal to the marginal gain
from remaining, which is given by the probabiity  that the opponent will concede in the next
instant, multiplied  by the gain of being the 'winner",  i.e.,  paying less than 1/2 of the costs of
stabilization. Note how important is the asymmetry of information in generating the delay. If
it is known  from the start which group has the highest cost of waiting, then the "loser" is known
from the start.  Thus, the "loser" concedes immediately, in order to avoid the costs of delays.
This 'war  of attrition" can be generalized to the case of n groups, with n  >  2.  This
extension  is immediate if the game ends witi  the first concession of one of the groups.  The
exension  is  more  complicated and  technically more  demanding if  after  the  first group
*concedes' and pays a high fraction of the costs, a new "war of attrition  begins between the
remaining (n-i) groups, fighting over the allocation of the remainder of the stabilization  costs.
Alesina and  Drazen (1991) derive several results  concerning the  expected time of
stabilizaton, which make this "war of attrition" model useful for empirical analysis.
1)  Poli¢ical  cohesion:  The more unequal is the distribution of the stabilization  costs,
eteris panbus, the more the stabilization  is-delayed.
If these costs are shared equally, stabilization  occurs immediately  since there is no gain
from being the "winner".  The more unequal is the distribution of costs, the higher is the gain
from being the  winner" and the higher the incentive to "wait the opponent out".  This result
suggests that stabilizations  should be delayed more in countries with less cohesion and more22
political polarization and instability, in which it is more difficult to reach an equitable "social
contract", with a "fair" allocation of costs.
2)  Costs of delaying: an increase in the costs of postponing the stabilization  reduces the
delay.
This somewhat obvious result becomes rather interesting if one thinks of these costs not
only as the economic costs of inflation but also as "political" costs.  For instance, the costs of
political action that each group needs to "pay" in order to avoid being imposed upon the larger
share of the costs of the stabilization. These costs of political action may be the loss in wages
and leisure time incurred by striking urban workers, the risks incurred by armec insurrectors,
the monetary costs incurred by the "capitalists" financing  their representative  in the legislature,
etc.  This interpretation suggests that political institutions which make it easier for even small
interest groups to "block" the legislative process by "veto power", are  conducive to delayed
stabilizations. For instance, strictly proportional electoral systems are more likely to generate
coalition govemnments  in which legislative action requires the consensus  of a large number of
parmies,  e&c; one  c£ which can  "veto".  Thus even a  small interest group can  "veto"  a
stabilization program, and procrastinate the "war of attrition".
3)  Income distribution:  The degree of income inequality  has ambiguous effects ont he
amount of delay in the following sense.
If  political and  economic resources  are  very  unequally distributed,  so  that  it  is
immediate.y obvious which group is stronger and has more resources to wait longer, the "war
of attrition" ends immediately since there is no uncertainty about the identity of the winner.
However, if the dispersion of resources across groups  is increased, maintaining the asymmetric23
information  distribution concerning relative costs, then more dispersion of costs and resources
lead to longer delays.
Alesina  and Drazen (1991)  argue that this "war of attrition" model is consistent  with three
elements which are very often (but nQ£  always)  observed in stabilization  processes:
1.  "There is an agreement over the need  of a fiscal change, but a political stalemate  over
how th* burden of higher taxes or expenditure  cuts should be allocated.  In the political debate
over the stabilization, this distributional question  is centrl".
2.  "When stabilization  occurs it coincides  with a political consolidation. Often, one side
becomes politically  dominant. The burden of stabilization  is sometimes  quite unequal, with the
politically weaker group becoming a larger burden.  Often this means the lower classes, with
successful  stabilizations  being regressive".
3.  'Successful stabilizations  are usually preceded by several failed attempts; often a
previous program appears quite similar to the successful  one".
Further progress in an empirical direction can be made by defining more clearly what
exactly is meant by a "concession". In theory, a "concession"  is simply the acceptance by one
of the groups of the role of the 'loser".  In pracdce, a "concession" may take different forms.
One is a clear electoral victor of one side.  This may make the legislative action easier for the
winning side, and raise to an unsustainable  level the political costs for the opponent to "veto"
stabilization  plans.  A second form is the acceptance  of one side to grant extraordinary powers
to the govemment, to avoid legislative  deadlocks. A third one is the recall of strikes, riots and
other forms of political actions of the workers' movement, if it is perceived that they are too
costly and unsustainable. A fourth one is the achievement  of a compromise  accepted  by all parts24
on the allocation of the burden of stabilization.  Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina (1988),
Eichengreen (1989), De Long and Eic.iengreen (1991), and Casella and Eichengreen (1991)
discuss  various case studies of successful  and failed stabilizations  from the point of view offered
by the 'war  of attrition'  model, and discuss various forms of "concession".
Drazen and Grill  (1990) extend the "war of attrition" model  by empi-,asizing  the possibie
benefits of economic crises.  They show that if an exogenous shock agg:  ..es the economic
conditions it may anticipate the resolution of the 'war  of attrition" by making the costs of not
stabilzing even higher.  In some cases such "crises' increase aggregate welfare:  in fact, the
costs of  the  adverse shock are  more thaza  compensated by  the benefits of  the anticipated
stabilization.
Fnally,  it should be emphasized  that the "war of attrition" idea is applicable not only to
for delays in fiscal stabilizations, but for many other cases of delays in adoption of "efficient"
reforms, such as rernoval of price controls or trade restrictions, etc. The key element for a "war
of attrition" to occur, is that the proposed reform has substantial  distributional effects and that
there is some uncertainty ex ante about the relative 'strength" of the various groups.
4.2  Class conflicts
Different classes may have different preferences over the urgency of a stabilization,  and
some may actually "gain"  from delaying the stabilization.  That is,  an unstable economy
provides benefits for some groups.
For  instance, Perotti  (1991) suggests that stabilizations may be delayed if the asset
holders perceive that they can escape taxation by exporting their assets abroad.  He considers25
an economy with three broadly defined classes: i) capital owners; ii) middle class or "skilled"
workers; iii) unskilled workers.  Suppose that  because of a fiscal imbalance, aggregate demand
is high and inflation is increasing:  a "social planner", once again, would choose to stabilize
immediately.  However, a political equilibrium  may lead to postponements for the following
reason.  Suppose that in the period of high aggregate demand and high inflation profits are
increasing and the wage of the unsldlled workers are indexed, thus they are approximately
constant in real  terms.  Profits are  increasing with aggregate demand in  an economy with
'increasing returns" to capital.
The capitalists would like to postpone  the stabilization,  if they think that they gain first,
because of the "increasing  returns" and then they can bring their profits abroad to escape  the tax
increse  needed to  stabilize.  The unskilled workers are  too poor  to  be  taxed after  the
stabilization.  Thus, the cost of the stabilization  falls mostly, or exclusively, on the "middle
class".  While the latter would prefer to stabilize  immediately  to minimize the overall costs, the
capitalists and  the  "unskilled workers" may prefer  to  postpone the  stabilization.  If  the
"capitalists" and the unskilled workers, together  have enough political influence, stabilizations
are delayed.
This model captures two important insights, which are  much more general than the
specific  example: first, not everybody  loses during the pre-stabilization  period; second, the very
nch and the very poor may be on the same side "against" the middle class.  In fact, it is well
known that in several cases of hyperinflation, the 'middle class'  has suffered the most.
Alesina  and Tabellini (1989)  present  a model  somewhat  related  to Perotti's.  Even  though
they do not focus explicitly  upon stabilizations,  they show that the possibility  of exporting capital26
leads to socially inefficient policies.  Governments "close" to the capitalists' interests would
borrow abroad and "redistribute" resources to the capitalists. Then, the latter would "escape"
taxation by  exporting capital, leaving to  the rest  of  the  economy the  interest bill on  the
government's foreign borrowing.
In summary, these type of models suggest that there may be cases in  which certain
coalitions actually benefit  from a  macroeconomic imbalance and manage to  postpone the
adjustment for their own advantage.
4.3  Uncemtain  outcomes of the stabilization
Fernandez and  Rodrik (1991) consider the  case of policy reform which makes the
miajnorty  of the population better off.  For concreteness, they think of the removal of a tariff as
the reform under consideration. All the producers in the export sectors are better off with the
reform; a fraction of the producers in the import competing sector will have to move to the
export sector and will be better off after the reform and their move.  Suppose that these two
groups are a majority of  the population.  However, because of an ex ante uncertainty about
which agents in the  import competing industry will end up benefitting from the reform, a
majority of the population may vote against the reform.  For certain pamameter,  values, even
V+;-.  :t.  a majority of the population  is better off  4th the reform, ex ante there is not
a majority in favor of it.  Tnis result holds even in the case of risk neutrality, but it is reinforced
in the case in which agents are risk averse.
Thus, this model emphasies  that uncertainty  concerning the identity of the losers from
a proposed reform may lead to a bias towards maintaining an inefficient status quo.  Even27
though Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) consider a trade reform, clearly their approach is much
more general and applicable  to fiscal reforms as well.
Milesi-Ferretti (1991)  suggests another reason based upon uncertain outcomes, for why
monetary and fiscal stabilizations  may be pos.poned. He considers a model in which the costs
of  stopping inflaton are uncertamin,  and depend upon how 'competent" the government is in
managing the reform.  That is, there are 'competent" govemments which manage to stabilize
with small economic costs and "incompetent"  ones, which also are capable of stabilizing, but
at higher costs.
If a stabilization  is started and it is learned that the government is "incompetent", the
public may choose to elect the opposition  which is expected to be more competent. Instead, if
the  government does  not  begin  a  program,  nothing  is  learned about  the  government's
competence. In this case, if the public favors the opposition, the latter would have to solve the
same problem faced by today's government  Thus, if  it is in  the interest of  the current
government to do nothing for fear of 'failure'  because of incompetence,  the public may have
no incentive to vote for the opposition because the latter would do the same, when in office.
What  is crucial,  here, is that the governent itself does not know  its own level  of competence,
otherwise the choice of doing something or nothing would reveal some of the government's
private information  concerning  its own competence.
This model is particularly  appropriate for cases in which a policy reform is relatively
new, and has never been attempted before, so that it is difficult to predict its costs and the
government  competence  on such grounds.  The case of policy reforms in Eastern Europe comes
immediately  to mind. More generally, the case of new  democratic  governments facing  economic28
crises, may be a good example for this model. A new democratic leadership  may be reasonably
'unknown'  to the public, since the new leadersihip  was never in office before.  At the same  time
the new democratic  opposition is also new to the political arena.  Thus, there might be very little
available information on both the new democratic government and the new opposition.
4.4  Institutions
Different institutional arrangements may be more or less conducive to macroeconcn.._
management  and to a swift reaction to economic crises, needing a stabilization.
In the discussion of  "wars of  attrition" it was alluded that  multiparty systems with
coalition governments may find it difficult to quickly achieve agreement on how to stabilize.
This is because each member of a coalition government may have a "veto power- and block any
program which is disliked by a certain (even small) constituency.  Coalition governments  are
more often observed in parliamentary democracies  with proportional representation. Therefore,
the inbdtution of proportionality may not be conducive to swift fiscal reform when they are
needed. Empirical results by Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) and Grilli, Masciandaro  and  Tabellini
(1991)  on OECD democracies are consistent  with these observations. They show that prolonged
,eriods  t-  fiscal -iihnlance  leading to the accumulation  of relatively high debt/GNP ratios have
been common in parliamentary democracies with large coalition governments.  On the other
hand, single party governments have reacted more quickly to prevent persistnt  deficits.
These  arguments  are  not  directly applicable to  dictatorships.  However, they are
somewhat  related to the previously mentioned discussion of "strong'  versus "weak" dictators.
A 'weak'  dictator may be the analog of a "weak" coalition government in a democracy.  A29
'weak'  dictator may have to please several constituencies  with conflicting interests in order to
survive.  Therefore, he would find it difficult to act promptly to resolve a fiscal crisis.
A second institutional  feature which  may affect fiscal management  and the implementation
of fiscal reforms is the possibility  of intra-state  or intra-bureaucratic  conflicts over the allocation
of  spending and taxation.  Fiscal  federalism, that is,  geographic decentralization of fiscal
decisions may make it difficult to act quickly when quick action is needed.  First of all, if local
authorities can, up to a point, atransfer" locally generated deficits to the federal system, they
may choose to  do so in  time of need.  That  is,  one may observe a  "prisoner's dilemma"
situation, in which different states or regions act non-cooperatively. Second, there might be,
once again, a 'veto  power'  from various states or regions blocldng  stabilization  plans decided
at the federal level.
A similar argument may apply to intra-bureaucratic  conflicts. Obviously, the relevance
of these conflicts would depend upon the degree of 'independence" of the bureaucracy from
elected officers.
A third institutional feature which could be very important  in the context of a discussion
of monetary and fiscal stability, is the degree of political independence  of the Central Bank.
A Central Bank independent from the Treasury and firmly committed to monetary control,
reduces the degree of monetization  of budget deficits.  This has two effects.  Frst,  it keeps
inflation under control.  Second,  it forces the government to find other sources of fincing,  and
ultimately, forces the government to raise taxes or cut spending.9
Several authors have  noted how, within industrial economies,  countries with low inflation
have independent  Cental  Banks. Furthermore, such low inflation has not been accompanied  by30
high unemployment,  high real interest rates or other undesirable 'real"  consequences. That is,
Central Bank  independence  seems to have helped monetary stability  with very small "real" costs.
These observations emerge from  work by  Bade and Parkin (1982), Alesina (1988, 1989),
Alesina and Summers (1991), Grilli, Masciandaro  and Tabellini (1991) and Alesina and Gril
(1992).  Clearly, the difficult part of this empirical analysis is the classification of  ,  degree
of  independence of  different Central Banks.  While this body  of  research has  a-  .ied a
reasonable degree of  consensus on  a  reliable classification of  the degree of  Cental  Bank
independence  for advanced industrial economies,  much  work remains to be done for all the other
countries.  Work in progress by Culderman, Webb and Neyapti (1991) is addressing this very
important question.
Although a Central Bank with an established reputation of independence may improve
policymaking, the process of establishing such reputation  may lead to period of policy  instability.
In fact, suppose that the treasury runs budget deficits and does not raise taxes in the an attempt
to induce the Centmal  Bank to monetize.  The latter refuse to do so, precisely to establish a
reputation of independence and  induce the Treasury to raise taxes and cut spending.  This
situation may lead to a sort of "war of attrition" between the Treasury and the Central Bank.
Both institutions pursue  their  uncoordinated policies, in  order  to  force  the  opponent or
"concede", as in models by Sargent and Wallace (1981), Tabellini (1986) and Loewy (1988).
Before one of the two players gives in, taxes are not raised and the deficit is not monetized;  such
a combination leads to a rapidly growing debt/GNP ratio.  Institutional arrangements which
guarantee Central Bank independence should insure that such an institutional 'war of attrition"
does not occur because the Treasury knows that the Central Bank will not "concede".  On the31
other hand, a 'war  of attrition" will not occur when the Central Bank has no independence  at
all, and the Treasury can obtain as much monelarization  as it is desired.
4.5  Inflation, taxation and political  stability: empirical evidence
There  are  three  ways  of  testing politico-economic models  of  inflation,  deficits,
stabilizations, or lack thereof.  The first one is case studies.  The second one is a comparative
method in which several cases are examined  jointly.  A third one is multi-ountry  econometric
studies.
The first two approaches have been adopted mostly (but not exclusively) by political
scientists.  The third one has been used mostly  (but not exclusively)  by economists.  A survey
of the empirical literature is, obviously,  well beyond the scope of this paper.  In what follows
I  will highlight some very  recent cross section econometric analysis with large  samples of
countries.
Haggard, Kaufman, Shariff  and Webb  (1990)  examine  the statistcal relationships  between
political regime type the ideological nature of different government and economic outcomres,
such as inflation, budget defeats and the adoption of stabilization programs.  They find that
periods of transition from authoritarian  regimes  to democracy  are often associated with economic
instability.  New democracies have a particularly difficult time in implementing stabilization
programs.  This finding is quite consistent  with a "war of attritionw  model.  After the collapse
of  an  authoritarian  and  repressive regime,  conflicting distributional  claims  of  various
socioeconomic groups are  likely to emerge.  Legislative  deadlock and inaction are typical of
such situations.32
Culierman, Edward. and Tabellini (1990) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991) show that,
after  controlling for  various economic determinants  of  inflation,  one  observes  a  strong
association  between govemment  instability  and the use of seignorage as a source of tax revenues.
Tbat  is,  'weak  governments" are  less  capable  of  using non-inflationary taxes  to  cover
government spending.
Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) and GnriU,  Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) find that
within OECD democracies, the  high debt  countries  are  almost  exclusively parliamentary
democracies  with a highly proportional  electoral system; conversely almost  all the countries with
such electoral systems have high public debt.  This evidence is broadly consistent with w:e  owa
of attrition' model: in strictly  proportional parliamentary systems, 'wars of attrition" are more
likely to occur because of the 'veto"  power of each coalition member.  Similar evidence for
developing  countries  is found by Ozler and Tabellini (1991). They show external debt in a large
panel of developing countries for the period 1973-82 is positively related to their reasonable
indicator of political instability.
An importait problem in this literature on government instability as an explanatory
variable for inflation and fiscal imbalance is that of joint endogeneity.  It is cerainly  true that
govemment  instability  may be a cause of inflation.  However, high inoflaion  and, more generally
economic instability may lead to  goverirrient collapse.  In  the  context of  a  study of  the
coeaion  between economic  growth and coup d'etat Londregan and Poole (1990) have shown
how to deal econometrically  with this problem of joint endogeneity.  Alesina, Ozler, Roubini
and Swagel (1991) have used this method for a study of the joint  detmination  of economic
growth and govemment changes  in both democracies and non-democracies. They find that both33
directions of causality are present: a high probability  of a government  collapse reduces growth;
conversely, low growth increases the likelihood  of a government change.
A similar analysis which accounts  for joint endogeneity  issues would be desirable for the
study of inflation and fiscal imbalances  as well.
5.  Conclusions
This paper has reviewed some recent formal  developments  in political economics which
study the relationship between the timing of macroeconomic  policy and political institutions.
Two important issues have been the focus of this review:  politcal business cycles and
monetary and fiscal stabilization policies.
Rather than reviewing the results described  in the previous  pages, this secdon highlights
several issues open for further research.
1) While we  now have a  reasonably sound and extensive body  of  theoretical and
empirical research on political business  cycles  in advanced  industrial  democracies, much  less has
been done for LDCs.  This research should taclde difficult issues, such as how to test for such
cycles in non-democracies.
2) The tansition  periods from dictatorships  to democracies are  extremely interesting
situaions  for studying politico-economic  interctions.  Researchers should devote careful and
specific attention to such periods.
3) Authoritarian regimes appear to be a non-homogeneous  group.  Some of them have
promoted growth and economic stability and have done better than the "average" democracy.34
Other authoritarian  regimes have destroyed their economies.  A further understanding  of what
explains these large differences  is likely to have very high intellectual returns.
4) The "normative" aspects  of political  economy should also be very high in the research
agenda.  Should  a new democracy  be asvised to adopt majoritarian systems, set up independent
central banks, to include budget balanced clauses in the Constitution, to limit the number of
times in which incumbents are allowed to run, delegate fiscal authority to local authorities to
have a bicameral system, to elect the President  directly?
These are only a few of the many questions which new democracies face.35
Notes
1.  It should  be emphasized  at the outset, that this paper is not meant to be an exhaustive  survey
of the litewature. For recent surveys of the literature on "political business cycles" the reader
is refered  to Alesina (1988)  and Nordhaus (1989). For a survey of the literature on the political
economy of development in  LDCs,  see Roubini (1990).  For  a  survey of  the  theoretical
contrbutions in the "new political  macroeconomics",  with emphasis  on fiscal policy see Persson
and Tabellini (1990) and Alesina and Tabellini (1992).  For a survey of the traditional Public
Choice literature see Mueller (1989).
2.  See Akerlof and Yellen (1985a,b) for applications  of "near rational models" to product and
labor markets.
3.  This section is largely based upon Sections 1 and 2 of Alesina and Roubini (1990).
4.  Whether inflation starts to increase before the election or only after the election, depends
upon the exact specification  of the model.  See Lindbeck (1976) for a discussion of this point.
5.  The United States is quite a good case for this theory.  For  a  general theoretical and
empirical model of macroeconomic  outcomes  and elections in the US see Alesina, Londgregan
and Rosenthal (1990).
6.  Alvarez, Garret and Lange (1991) have investigated the role of labor organizons  in a
'pardsan'  model of macroeconomic  policy.
7.  See Roubini (1990) for a recent survey of this literature.
8.  See Grossman (1991) for  an  interesting formalization of  the  probability of  successful
insurections against dictators.36
9.  See Rogoff  (1985), Lohmann  (1991) and Alesina  and Grilli (1991) for theoretical  discussions
*.
of the benefits of Central Bank independence.37
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